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FEDERAL MARITIME JURISDICTION OVER
INLAND INTRASTATE LAKES
RALPH MCCAUGHAN*-
The silver oar, long the historic symbol of admiralty practice in
federal courts in the coastal districts, would hardly have been recog-
nized fifteen years ago in a federal court in Nevada, Wyoming, or
any of the other inland states not bordering on the Great Lakes or
the Mississippi River. In recent years, however, the inland waters of
this country have been increased by the development of new man-made
lakes and have been exploited by the increased maritime traffic of rec-
reational boating. This inland marine activity has increased to the
extent that the admiralty law has found its way upstream and is be-
coming an important field of law in all the districts of the federal
judiciary.
The two most important factors in this development are (i) the
construction of large hydro-electric and flood control systems by which
streams were made into large lakes, and (2) the increased popularity
of pleasure boating.
Before the advent of electricity and the hydro-electric power plant
most of our inland states' water resources were limited to natural
ones. A certain amount of damming of streams was accomplished
on a small scale to set up milling operations and for flood control,
but it was not until the 1930's that the inland waters of the United
States were significantly increased. During the 193o's the depression
brought about extensive public works projects including the Tennessee
Valley Authority, which is typical of the many hydro-electric and flood
control projects undertaken by the federal government. A 1963 article
about cruising on the lakes of the Tennessee Valley Authority project
is evidence of the tremendous scope of this single government project:
The TVA lake system has a shoreline of over io,ooo miles in
Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Ten-
*Associate, English, McCaughan & O'Bryan, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. B.A.
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nessee and Mississippi... a vast, uncrowded and beautiful cruis-
ing ground exists within trailering distance ... a cruising
ground which extends over 350 miles from east to west and
nearly 200 miles from north to south .... There are 29 TVA
reservoirs which similarly combine unspoiled and beautiful
cruising waters with camping and launching sites, and mod-
em shopping, vacation and lodging facilities. There are some
350 fishing camps, marinas, and resorts on the TVA lakes, 40
group camps, 13 state parks, 67 county and municipal parks,
and 400 access areas maintained by state and local govern-
ments.1
Other areas where federal hydro-electric and flood control projects
have increased the inland boating areas available are the far west
and the Boulder Dam area.2 Lake Springfield in central Illinois is
another example of the creation of an inland boating area. This arti-
ficial lake was created by the damming of two streams, and the lake
now contains 21.4 billion gallons of water and has a shoreline of
57 miles. The lake is used by many varied craft including cruisers,
sail and motorboats, pontoon and small fishing craft. Other uses of
the lake include a United States Naval Training Center, a Coast
Guard Center, an Air Force Reserve Center, and a station of the
civilian Illinois Naval Squadron.
3
The examples above indicate the far-reaching impact of the many
recent projects, federal and state, to harness the undeveloped and un-
controlled water power of the United States. Some of these new water-
ways have been developed commercially, but the largest increase in
inland water traffic which has caused the need for admiralty practice
in these inland districts has been the growth of pleasure boating
traffic made possible by post-war prosperity and developments in boat
manufacturing.
4
'MOTOR BOATING, June, 1963, at 92.
2Witness to the increased importance of western boating resulting from the
dam is found in the following quotation: "Western boating has exploded over
every wet spot this side of the Rockies, but the Lake Mead, Colorado River, and
Salton Sea regions will continue to play host to the most, with millions of boat
owners annually." YACHTING, July, 1962, at i3o.
A federal project has also brought water resources to the inland areas of
Texas. The change took place "when the U.S. Corps of Engineers began completing
vast flood control impoundments such as Lake Texoma, Possum Kingdom Lake,
Grapevine, Whitney, and dozens of others which today dot the countryside."
MOTOR BOATING, Jan., 1963, at 74. These lakes, which also include the largest
lake wholly within the state, Lake Texarkana, are so extensive that together they
control "almost every major river in Texas." Id.
3MoTOR BOATING, June, 1963, at 124.
,TVA Annual Report for 1962: in 5 fiscal years 1957-1961, commercial traffic
on the Tennessee River Complex exceeded 2 billion ton-miles per year.
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A reliable 1962 estimate stated that the total number of non-com-
mercial boats in use on all waters of the United States was 7,468,ooo,
which represented an over-all gain of 293,0o0 boats over the 1961 es-
timate. This 1962 figure was broken down into the following type
craft:
Inboard motor boats 795,000
Outboard motor boats 4,085,000
Sailboats, w/o aux. 483,000
Rowboats, canoes, etc., including
many outboard powered 2,1o5,0005
From the above figures it is obvious that outboard powered craft
account for over 8o% of the pleasure craft in use, and, as another in-
dex of the boating industry's growth, the following statistics for out-
board motors are helpful:
Outboard motors in use - 1950 - 2,811,000
Outboard motors in use - 1967 - 6,904,0006
Besides the availability of consumer capital due to the post-war boom
years, this tremendous growth in the use of pleasure craft can be ex-
plained by the improvement of pleasure-type boats and motors. Furth-
ermore, the introduction of boat trailers which are light and maneu-
verable, and equipped with winches, has opened up the vast area of
recreation waters to those people who live within driving distance
of these new lakes. This new mobility is expounded in the following
excerpt from an article on western boating in Yachting magazine:
Los Angeles boat owners think nothing of hitching on the boat
trailer on Friday night, driving 300 miles to Boulder Beach
outside Las Vegas, Nevada, boating for two days, and returning
home in time for work Monday morning.
7
The possible expansion of federal maritime jurisdiction coupled
with this increase in maritime traffic in our inland waters and the
inevitable increase in boating accidents on these waters may well result
in litigation which will place many land-loving general practitioners
in the strange maritime world of proctors, libellants and respondents.
Lake complexes such as those of the TVA and Boulder Dam pro-
jects often touch more than one state, and sometimes are provided
with a connecting river or a series of locks by which interstate com-
merce can be carried on. In these situations there is no question of
r OTOR BOATING, Jan. 1963, at 404.
6BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1968 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 208 (89th ed. 1968).
WAcHrnNG, July, 1962, at 83.
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admiralty jurisdiction.8 On the other hand, it is obvious from a well
established Supreme Court decision 9 interpreting article III, section
2 of the Constitution 0 that completely intrastate lakes which are
small and which have no significant interstate connection are not
generally considered to be within the federal maritime jurisdiction. In
between these extremes there are numerous man-made lakes of consid-
erable size, but which lie wholly within one state and are without a
direct channel or other means of navigation into interstate commerce.
There are two surrounding circumstances which present the most
formidable bars to the extension of federal maritime jurisdiction to
these man-made lakes: first, these lakes usually require a boat portage
around the dam to "navigate" the lake's outlet into interstate com-
merce; and second, these lakes are predominantly used for recreation-
al purposes only. In the following discussion the general question of
federal maritime jurisdiction over inland waters will be considered
first. Certain policies and trends will come to light which aid in finding
an answer to the question raised by this article, viz., will federal mari-
time jurisdiction be extended to man-made recreational lakes lying
wholly within one state, and without direct means of interstate navi-
gation other than by portage?
The judicial power of the United States was extended to "all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" by article III, section 2 of
the Constitution. This grant of judicial power was implemented by
section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which gave the district courts
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.... "' Although changed in wording by the
Judiciary Code of 1948,12 the Supreme Court of the United States
construed the new language to mean the same thing as section 9 of
the 1789 Act.13 The extent of this jurisdiction over civil cases of ad-
miralty and maritime law was finally delineated in the landmark
decision of De Lovio v. Boit,14 which held that admiralty jurisdiction
in the federal courts comprehended all maritime contracts, torts and
injuries. The extent of the admiralty jurisdiction to particular
6The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 233 (1851).
OThe Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (so Wall.) 557, 561 (1870).
1 Art. III, section 2 provides: "The judicial power [of the United States] shall
extend.., to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction...."
uJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 2o, § 9, 1 Stat. 77, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1965).
"28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1965) (corresponds to Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 2o, § 9,
1 Stat. 77).
"Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
"7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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"waters" and "vessels," which must necessarily be involved here, was
under early influence of English admiralty law. However, the English
exclusion from admiralty of all waters not tidal in nature, carefully
guarded by the common law courts, was finally eliminated in the
United States in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh.15
The Genesee Chief was concerned with the constitutionality of the
Act of February 26, 1845,16 which extended jurisdiction of the district
courts to certain cases upon lakes and navigable rivers connecting
them. After stating that the grounds for the constitutionality of the
statute must be that these waters were within the scope of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction as comprehended by the framers of the
constitution, the Supreme Court discussed the major obstacle to such
recognition when it said: "[T]here is no tide in the lakes or the waters
connecting them."'17 The Court summarily rejected the contention
that this requirement existed when the constitution was adopted and
held that the fact that there is an ebb and flow of tide does not make
waters "peculiarly suitable" for inclusion within admiralty juris-
diction. Likewise, the Court specifically held that the absence of tides
did not make inland waters "unfit" to be included within federal
maritime jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court said that there cannot
be any reason for allowing admiralty jurisdiction over "public tide
water" but not over "any other public water used for commercial
purposes and foreign trade." The Court concluded: "The lakes and
the waters connecting them are undoubtedly public waters; and we
think are within the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
in the constitution of the United States."' 8
Two important jurisdictional elements are indicated in The Gen-
esee Chief: first, the inclusion of lakes and connecting waters used for
commercial purposes within the federal maritime jurisdiction; and
second, the public nature of these waters so included. The first ele-
ment was discussed in 1870 in The Daniel Ball'9 where the Supreme
Court pointed out the need for a different test to be applied in de-
termining the navigability of certain rivers, and then stated that
this test is based upon "navigable capacity;" that is, "[R]ivers must
be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in
fact."'20 The Court then said that rivers are "navigable in fact" when
u53 U.S. (12 How.) 233 (1851).
"Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726.
1753 U.S. at 238.
28d. at 241.
"77 U.S. (io Wall.) 557 (1870).
21Id. at 563.
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they are actually used, "in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water."2 ' The test for navi-
gability was then more specifically defined in terms of navigability
under federal statutes as distinguished from navigable waters as
determined by the states. This test of federal navigability is that
the rivers "form in their ordinary conditions by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce
is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries in the
customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
'22
Thus the requirement of interstate commerce was imposed upon fed-
eral maritime jurisdiction.
Less than one year after this important decision the Supreme Court
closed the question of federal maritime jurisdiction over inland lakes
and rivers, under the "navigability in fact" test. Insurance Co. v.
Dunham,23 considered the overall United States view of federal mari-
time jurisdiction, as it differed from the English tide-water test, and
said that "a long train of decisions has settled that it extends not
only to the main sea, but to all the navigable waters of the United
States, or bordering on the same, whether landlocked or open, salt or
fresh, tide or no tide."24 Dunham concluded that with The Genessee
Chief and "several cases since decided .... [the English tide-water test]
must be considered as no longer open for discussion in this court."
25
This question of federal maritime jurisdiction over inland waters
held in Dunham to be "no longer open for discussion," still presents
a problem of major proportions in consideration of the jurisdictional
status of man-made lakes. "Navigability" was assumed in Dunham,
but the navigability of a body of water must always be assessed in a
federal context, and in accordance with the standard of The Daniel
Ball when the question of federal maritime jurisdiction arises. That is,
the waters must "constitute navigable waters of the United States with-
in the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the States .... -26 This navigability must exist de-
spite the fact that the dams which create the lakes in question are
without locks or channels and therefore obstruct direct interstate water
commerce. This fact must be considered in light of the predominance
=1d.
=Id.
2878 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
21d. at 25.
Id. at 26.
'6The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (1o Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
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of the recreational use of the man-made lakes under consideration
here.
The Supreme Court's attitude toward channel obstructions was
expressed in The Montello27 where the Court indicated its tendency
to overlook minor impediments to clear navigation and to extend the
federal maritime jurisdiction to inland waters whenever possible. In
that case the Court referred to contentions that the river involved was
not navigable because of sand bars and other obstructions and said,
"It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river
was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not
be treated as a public highway." 28 The Court then discussed the navi-
gation which took place before the river was improved, which naviga-
tion the Court considered sufficient to render the river capable of
interstate commerce. This navigation was by certain boats which were
"propelled by animal power, [and] were able to navigate the entire
length of Fox River, with the aid of a few portages .... -29 The Court
next considered waters which are obstructed, and incapable of com-
pletely clear navigation, but which are still considered "navigable"
for purposes of federal maritime jurisdiction. After pointing out
that there are few fresh water rivers which in their natural state are
capable of "uninterrupted navigation," the Court stated, "[T]he vi-
tal and essential point is whether the natural navigation of the river is
such that it affords a channel for useful commerce." 30 If the river
is such a "channel for useful commerce" then the all-important hold-
ing of this case pertains; that is, that the river is then "navigable in
fact, although its navigation may be encompassed with difficulties
by reason of natural barriers, such as rapids and sand-bars." 31 This
apparent dismissal of sand bars and rapids as obstructions for com-
merce, although the case specifically refers to rivers, is a strong in-
dication of a liberal Supreme Court attitude toward extending fed-
eral maritime jurisdiction to inland waters of all kinds.
However, The Montello leaves the important question unanswered
as to the extent to which the Supreme Court today would follow
a similarly liberal attitude and extend maritime jurisdiction to the
man-made lakes under consideration here. Although these lakes can
provide interstate connections only for the pleasure craft which dom-
inate them by means of portages around dams, a further examination
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of cases nevertheless indicates the probability of this jurisdictional ex-
tension. The approach to navigational obstructions in The Montello
was still pertinent in 1921 when Economy Light & Power Co. v.
United States32 was decided. That case considered the navigability
of the Des Plaines River in a question of federal jurisdiction and the
power to enjoin the construction of a private dam on that river. The
Court referred to the proper test laid down in The Daniel Ball and
The Montello: "[T]he test whether the river, in its natural state, is
used, or capable of being used as a highway for commerce, over which
trade and travel is or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water."3 3 More importantly the Court specifically
dismissed the objections to navigation because of portages and ob-
structions by saying: "Navigability, in the sense of the law, is not
destroyed because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional natur-
al obstructions or portages .... "34
It is conceded that most of these earlier cases involve natural ob-
structions and are not concerned with hydro-electric dams, but a sound
analogy to man-made dams can arguably be made. In United States
v. Utah,3 5 a suit to quiet title to land forming the bed of the Colorado
River, The Montello was cited in part, but the Supreme Court went
further and held that "[ejach determination as to navigability must
stand on its own facts."3 6 This indicates a very flexible attitude to-
ward the question of navigability, and an attitude by which the Court
will not only consider each situation under the broad scope of The
Daniel Ball and The Montello, but also will carefully weigh the par-
ticular facts involved. The standard will thus be of broad scope, as is
demonstrated in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. 3 7
In that case, which involved federal power jurisdiction over the
New River in Virginia, the Supreme Court considered in detail the
concept of navigability as dealt with in prior decisions. It is obvious
throughout the opinion that the Court did not want to be bound
by a narrow test. For example, when the court discussed "navigability"
as a legal concept it said that navigability is "not to be determined
by a formula which fits every type of stream under all circumstances
and at all times." 38 That the Court could find navigability even in
2256 U.S. 113 (1921).
'*Id. at 121-22.
3id. at 122.
a.283 US. 64 (1931).
311d. at 87.
3'11 U.S. 377 (1940).
38d. at 404.
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an unusual fact situation of the type we are considering here is made
clear in the statement that, "Our past decisions have taken due account
of the changes and complexities in the circumstances of a river. We
do not purport now to lay down any single definitive test."39 Instead,
the Court stated its intention to "draw from the prior decisions in
this field and apply them, with due regard to the dynamic nature of
the problem, to the particular circumstances presented....,40 Having
made it clear that not only judicial precedent, but also the particular
fact situation, will be considered, the Court then re-emphasized the
importance of the particular set of facts when it said: "Both the
standards and the ultimate conclusion involve questions of law insep-
arable from the particular facts to which they are applied."41 The Ap-
palachian Power case drew from the admiralty jurisdiction cases in
expanding federal power jurisdiction. Citing The Montello it pointed
out: "There has never been doubt that the navigability referred to in
the cases was navigability despite the obstruction of falls, rapids, sand
bars, carries or shifting currents."
42
From this discussion it is evident that the Supreme Court does not
consider natural obstructions, carries and portages as significant bars
to the navigability of a particular body of water. This liberal attitude
toward extending maritime jurisdiction to inland waters, coupled
with the Court's view that the nature of the problem requires a flex-
ible fact situation analysis, points to a favorable consideration of a
portage around a dam in the instant problem. That is, from the
precedents dealing with natural obstructions, it appears that a short
portage would not be considered a significant obstruction which would
bar maritime jurisdiction. But aside from the portage problem, there
still exists the requirement first laid down in The Daniel Ball that
the navigable waters form "a continued highway over which com-
merce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign coun-
tries ... .,"43 This "commerce" requirement must be considered in
relation to the predominantly recreational use of the lakes in ques-
tion here.
Any possible doubt as to the inclusion of "lakes" in general within
federal maritime jurisdiction was dismissed in Wilburn Boat Company





377 U.S. (1o Wall.) 557, 5653 (1870).
"201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953).
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"settled doctrine that navigable lakes are public waters and are within
the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the Constitution
of the United States." 45 An important phase of this question of lake
jurisdiction can be approached by drawing an analogy to The Robert
W. Parsons.46 There, the Supreme Court considered the existence of
federal maritime jurisdiction over the portion of the Erie Canal,
wholly within the state of New York. Although the portion of the
canal in question was concededly navigable in an interstate manner
through a series of locks, the Court still thought it necessary to clear
up the question of a possible bar to maritime jurisdiction because
that canal link was isolated within the state of New York. Accord-
ingly, even though the portion of the canal involved was wholly with-
in the state of New York, it was still found to form a "highway of
commerce" between ports of different states and also foreign countries.
Thus, it appears that a contention that the wholly intrastate charac-
ter of a body of water barred its inclusion in federal maritime juris-
diction would not be successful, provided that navigability in the
sense of a "highway of commerce" existed thereon.
If the commerce requirement mentioned so often in the cases
dealing with jurisdictional problems first imposed restrictions on the
scope of federal maritime jurisdiction, it has been narrowed by a
trend evident in the important cases discussed above in relation to
navigability and portages. As early as 1870 in The Daniel Ball, the
Supreme Court referred to navigable water as "highways for com-
merce," not only in the sense of highways for "trade" but also as
highways for "travel." 47 Conceding that this perhaps referred to travel
by fare-paying passengers, "travel" is nevertheless a deviation from a
concept of "commerce" which includes only trade in material good.
The Montello refers to the "true criterion of the navigability of a
river" in terms of not only the capability for public use for com-
merce, but also public use for "transportation." 48 Again, this cannot
be presumed to include pleasure craft and recreational use, but it is
still a definite exclusion of a narrow commercial trade requirement
for navigability.
The matter has been approached in more detail in the lower
courts. In The Francesca,49 where a boat owner was sued for the
death of a passenger, the court, while referring to the Limitation of
451d. at 8S5.
46191 U.S. 17 (1903).
4777 U.S. (1O Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)-
'887 U.S. (2o Wall.) 430, 441 (1874).
419 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
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Liability Act,50 pointed out that there was no reference at all to the
types of vessels to be covered by that Act. Then, discussing the amend-
ment to the Act which included canal boats and "any vessels on rivers
and in inland navigation" the court stated, "[I]t has uniformly been
held by the courts that the question of the right to limitation of
liability is not based upon the engagement of the vessel in maritime
commerce, and further it is not based upon the question of the
size of the craft."5 1 The Supreme Court alluded to this same problem
in Appalachian Power where, in considering the navigability of the
river, it summarized the federal maritime view of the so-called
"commerce" requirement: "Nor is lack of commercial traffic a bar to
a conclusion of navigability where personal or private use by boats
demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler types of
commercial navigation.
'5 2
Perhaps the most complete judicial recognition of the importance
of traffic other than commercial traffic on our inland waters is found
in Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc.53 There,
the Ohio court held that the navigability of certain waters decided
solely upon the basis of commercial use "fails to take cognizance of
the tremendous increase in the public use of water ways .... And this
increased recreational use of our waters has been accompanied by
a corresponding lessening of their use for commerce." 54 The court
reflected a growing trend stating, "We are in accord with the modern
view that navigation for pleasure and recreation is as important in
the eyes of the law as navigation for a commercial purpose." 5
An analysis of the foregoing material in relation to the jurisdic-
tional problem under consideration here leads to two basic con-
clusions.
First, the Supreme Court in all of its decisions concerned with
federal maritime jurisdiction over inland waters has shown a tendency
to extend that jurisdiction in spite of natural obstructions which would
seriously impede commerce and traffic on those allegedly navigable
waters. The Genesee Chief led off the line of decisions holding "lakes
and the waters connecting them" to be navigable. Then The Daniel
Ball laid down the "navigability in fact" test. Finally, the court in
r046 U.S.C. § 183 (1965) limits the liability of the owner of a boat or ship
to an amount equal to his interest in the vessel.
u19 F. Supp. at 832.
£2381 U.S. at 416.
W l7O Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959).
"Id. at 378.
mId.
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The Montello, Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States, and
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. made little of
natural obstructions, including portages, in extending federal mari-
time jurisdiction to various undeveloped rivers and streams. This
certainly would indicate that the Court might consider a short
portage around a man-made dam as insufficient to bar a holding that
that waterway was non-navigable.
Second, the Supreme Court's holding in Appalachian Power shows
that a lack of commercial traffic alone does not bar admiralty jurisdic-
tion over certain waters; and the Mentor case indicates a trend to
find recreational use within the commerce requirements of the consti-
ution for federal maritime jurisdiction.
Whether these two conclusions will be adopted when the Supreme
Court decides that a body of water made interstate by a man-made
dam is or is not within the federal maritime jurisdiction, remains to
be seen. A recent case indicates that sound reasoning and the prece-
dents discussed above could lead the Court to such an adoption.
Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell56 was decided in the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1957. The problem under con-
sideration there was approached and almost summarily disposed of
as the court held a man-made intrastate lake to be within the federal
maritime jurisdiction. The case was heard on appeal from In re
Wood,57 a petition for limitation of liability under the Limitation
of Liability Act heard in the United States District Court for the
Wrestern District of Missouri. The lower court decision, discussed
first below, gives considerably more detail as to the fact situation
involved.
The original petition for limitation of liability arose from a
boating tragedy in which a passenger boat overturned and a con-
siderable number of persons drowned. This accident occurred on
the Lake of the Ozarks, a lake in central Missouri created by the
Bagnell Dam on the Osage River. The lower court opinion states
that as a result of the dam on this "navigable stream .... [I]t is
physically impossible for boats to operate freely up and down the
Osage River."58 Then the court turned to the foremost question of
navigability, holding that the impossibility of river navigation "does
not destroy the legal concept of navigability. - The lower court
0245 F.2d 3o6 (8th Cir. 1957).
Wi45 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
5Id. at 854.
5Id.
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then gave two reasons for so holding. The first reason is that "the
Osage River is an historically navigable stream, and remains under
the control of the Department of Commerce, which licenses boats and
vessels operating upon the Lake of the Ozarks." 60 The second reason
listed is that the boats operating on the lake "are also subject to
inspection as to seaworthiness by the United States Coast Guard."
61
The first and apparently controlling reason for the decision on this
point is a new and interesting ground for maritime jurisdiction.
Although not used by courts in the important cases discussed above,
if judicially accepted, the fact that a particular stream or river was
once navigable and is still under government control of some sort
would mean an unquestionable extension of federal maritime jurisdic-
tion to that body of water. This would include the extensive system
of lakes formed within the United States by federal power and flood
control projects. When taken up by the court of appeals, however,
neither of the grounds for decision used by the district court were
considered. Rather, in a summary manner, the court disposed of
the question of federal maritime jurisdiction over the Lake of the
Ozarks: "The Lake of the Ozarks was created by the Bagnell Dam in
the Osage River. The lake is entirely within the state of Missouri,
but is navigable water within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States."
62
Since the Loc-Wood case, the conclusions drawn above have been
reinforced by numerous decisions in the federal courts. 03 In re
Howser64 considered the navigability of Lake Hickory, North Carolina,
which was created by the damming up of the Catawba River. The
fact situation in the Howser case was similar to that in the Loc-Wood
case in that Lake Hickory was both man-made and intrastate. After
citing the general rule of The Daniel Ball and setting forth the his-
tory of the Catawba River as personally known to the judge presid-
ing, the court held that Lake Hickory was not navigable. This de-
cision was supported by the fact that the Catawba was a shallow and
shoaling river before it was developed for hydro-electric use, and
MId.
mId.
cLoc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306, 307 (8th Cir. 1957).
c'E.g., In re Builders Supply Co., 278 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Iowa 1968); Madole
v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965); Ingram v. Associated Pipeline
Contractors, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1965); Marine Office of America v.
Manion, 241 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass. 1965); In re Howser, 227 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.C.
1964); Johnson v. WVurthman, 227 F. Supp. 135 (D. Ore. 1964); Shogry v. Lewis,
225 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
"222 7 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
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further by findings of the Federal Power Commission and the Corps
of Engineers that the Catawba was not considered to be navigable
above Camden, South Carolina, far below Lake Hickory. Although
the court did not discuss the lack of a historically navigable channel,
this fact must be considered along with the facts above in distinguish-
ing Howser from Loc-Wood.
Johnson v. Wurthman,6 5 like Howser, approached the question of
the navigability of a small lake lying wholly within the State of
Oregon. The only outlet of the lake was a ditch in which the water
was never more than four or five inches in depth; and there were two
main inlets, neither of which touched navigable waters or were
navigable in themselves. The court distinguished Loc-Wood by
repeating the assertion of the lower court in that case that the river
in question "was historically a navigable stream."06 The court con-
cluded with a rule "applicable to the facts in this case ... that small
bodies of water, wholly in one state and not navigable in interstate
or foreign water commerce, are not included in any common sense
definition of navigable waters of the United States."0 7 The precedent
of the Loc-Wood case is thus still intact in those situations where a
stream was "historically" navigable.
Federal maritime jurisdiction over Lake Winnipesaukee in New
Hamphire came into question in Marine Office of America v.
Manion.68 The United States District Court of Massachusetts held that
lake to be non-navigable, despite contentions of the libellant that
"navigation can proceed from it to the sea by way of the Winni-
pesaukee and Merrimack Rivers." 69 Evidently, no proof of this fact
was offered and the libellant's reliance on Loc-Wood was dismissed
as follows: "Loc-Wood Boat & Motors v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 3o6
(8th Cir. 1957), cited by the libellant, does hold otherwise; but I do
not find it persuasive." 70 The reasoning for the district court's hold-
ing in this case, contrary to Loc-Wood, is unclear and it can only be
assumed that the elements of a historically navigable stream and con-
tinued government supervision were not present here.
A recent case which most nearly approximates the fact situation
in Loc-Wood is Madole v. Johnson7l which involved an accident on
Lake Hamilton in Arkansas. Formed by the Ohachita River behind
05227 F. Supp. 135 (D. Ore. 1964).
Id. at 137.
67Id. at 138.
6241 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass. 1965).
6'Id. at 622.
701d.
7'24 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965).
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Carpenter Dam near Hot Springs, Arkansas, Lake Hamilton was
found to be a part of the navigable waters of the United States. The
court set forth the traditional rule of navigability from The Daniel
Ball and The Montello, and then proceeded to apply the concept
used by the court in Loc-Wood. That is, regardless of present obstruc-
tions to navigation, the navigability of a stream or river, once con-
sidered navigable, is not necessarily lost. Specifically, the court quoted
this concept as stated in Appalachian Power and Economy Light &
Power. After following Loc-Wood, the court distinguished three cases,
decided on similar but not precisely corresponding fact situations.
Shogiy v. Lewis,72 which was cited as authority for the court's de-
cision in Manion73 above, was distinguished as involving a lake which
was landlocked and not part of a navigable stream.74 Likewise the
historical non-navigability of the subject stream and rivers was
pointed out in reference to the Johnson and Howser cases, both dis-
cussed above.
The most recent case involving these questions is In re Builders
Supply Co. 75 In holding a small landlocked Iowa Lake to be non-
navigable, the court distinguished Loc-Wood as being "critically
factually divergent" in that it "had historically been navigable and
it remained under the control of the Commerce Department which
licensed and inspected vessels operating on the Lake of Ozarks."
7 6
The cases just discussed which were decided subsequent to Loc-
Wood have been in accord with that decision, or are distinguishable
from that case on the facts. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn
that the federal maritime jurisdiction may well be extended to man-
made intrastate bodies of water, including those obstructed from inter-
state commerce by dams, where the stream or river involved is his-
torically navigable and there exists any degree of government control,
such as that which existed in Loc-Wood. It is obvious that the federal
courts have cracked, if not opened, the door of the vast inland recrea-
tion centers of America to the jurisdiction of federal maritime law.
CONCLUSION
The extension of federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to
intrastate, man-made lakes will have two significant consequences for
litigants, one of a procedural nature and the other substantive.
2225 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
3241 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass. 1965).
'225 F. Supp. 741, 742 (XW.D. Pa. 1964).
'278 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Iowa i968).
70Id. at 257.
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If the fact situation involved places the case within federal mari-
time jurisdiction, the plaintiff will have the following choice of
forums: (1) file his suit in a state court and obtain a trial by jury;
77
(2) file suit in federal court in the usual manner, provided the re-
quirements of diversity and jurisdictional amount are present; 78 or
(3) file suit in admiralty by filing his suit on the admiralty side of the
federal district court docket.70
Regardless of the forum chosen by the plaintiff, the substantive
rules differ from those in the ordinary personal injury case. The
defendant owner of a vessel involved in a personal injury suit
enjoys an advantage unique in the law of admiralty provided by the
Limitation of Liability Act.8 0 This act provides, inter alia, that where
the owner is not operating the vessel, the defendant owner can limit
his liability to his interest in the vessel which may be zero in cases
where the boat sinks. Furthermore, case law has provided that under
certain circumstances quite common to pleasure boating mishaps, the
Limitation Act allows the defendant to enjoin any pending state court
actions against him8l and have the entire case decided by the ad-
miralty court.8 2 Therefore, the defendant has not only limited his
liability but has also deprived the plaintiff of his jury trial in state
or federal court civil action.
Equally as important as limitation of liability in admiralty cases
is the non-applicability in most cases of the common law rule of
contributory negligence which completely bars recovery to an injured
person. Unlike the common law, "admiralty has developed and now
follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such con-
sideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as
justice requires."8 3 On the other hand, if the negligence consists of
the violation of one of the Rules of the Road (which is highly probable
in a motor boat accident) then the admiralty rules are more strict
than common law rules would be.
8 4
The two consequences summarily discussed above are an indica-
tion of the great importance of the extension of federal maritime
jurisdiction considered in this article.
'728 U.S.C. § 1333 (964).
"Id.
7Id.
46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
"The San Pedro, 223 U.S. 365 (1912).
"Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207 (1927).
"Page & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 4o6, 409 (1953).
4A. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW or ADMIRALTY, § 7-5 (1957).
